Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2002

Exxon Mobile Corporation v. Utah State Tax
Commission and State of Utah : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark L. Snelson; Assistant Utah Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellees.
David J. Crapo; Wood Crapo; Attorney for Appellant;.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Exxon Mobile v. Utah State Tax Commission, No. 20021023.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2322

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Case No. 20021023-SC

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
and STATE OF UTAH,

Oral Argument Priority No. 14

Respondent/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF AN ORDER AND UNDERLYING RULINGS
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

Clark L. Snelson #4673
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone (801) 366-0375

David J. Crapo #5055
Wood Crapo LLC
60 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 366-6060

Attorneys for Appellees

Attorneys for Appellant

FILED
UTAH SUPREME COURT

HAR 1 ? ?003
PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
EXXONMOBIL CORPORATION,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Case No. 20021023-SC

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
and STATE OF UTAH,

Oral Argument Priority No. 14

Respondent/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW
OF AN ORDER AND UNDERLYING RULINGS
OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

Clark L. Snelson #4673
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone (801) 366-0375

David J. Crapo #5055
Wood Crapo LLC
60 East South Temple, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 366-6060

Attorneys for Appellees

Attorneys for Appellant

COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES
1.

ExxonMobil Corporation (Petitioner in the Agency Proceeding)

2.

Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission (Respondent in the
Agency Proceeding)

3.

Phillips Petroleum Company (filed an Amicus Brief in Support of
ExxonMobil's Request for Reconsideration in the Agency Proceeding)

n

TABLE OF CONTENTS
COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

v

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

ISSUES PRESENTED

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION AT
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

III.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

6

6
10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

12

ARGUMENT
I.

15

II.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULE 21 .B RELIED ON BY THE
COMMISSION TO DECLARE THE DIVISION THE
PREVAILING PARTY IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE
IT CONFLICTS WITH THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT THAT THE COMMISSION ACT AS A
QUORUM TO ENFORCE TAX OBLIGATIONS
THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT NAMED THE
DIVISION THE PREVAILING PARTY BECAUSE THE
DIVISION, NOT EXXONMOBIL, BORE THE BURDEN
OF OVERCOMING A STATUTORY PRESUMPTION

iii

15

19

III.

IF THE COURT DOES NOT CONCLUDE THAT
EXXONMOBIL IS THE PREVAILING PARTY, THE
COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE COMMISSION'S
RULING THAT "VALUE AT THE WELL" MEANS THE
"POINT OF SALE" BECAUSE THIS RULING VIOLATES
THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A.

B.

C.

D.

24

The Plain Language of the Severance Tax
Act Requires That ExxonMobil's Oil and Gas
Production Be Valued "At the Well," Rather
than at Some Other Downstream Point
of Sale

25

The Commission's Decision That "Value at
the Well" Means the "Point of Sale" Is Not in
Harmony with Other Provisions of the
Severance Tax Act

30

If the Court Determines That the Severance
Tax Act Is Ambiguous, Utah Law Requires
That the Act Be Interpreted Liberally in Favor
of the Taxpayer

31

The Commission's Interpretation That
Production Is Completed at the Point of Sale
Results in Disparate Tax Treatment of Similarly
Situated Taxpayers and Potentially Violates
Utah's Constitution

34

CONCLUSION

35

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

37

ADDENDUM
1.

2.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Decision, April 19,2002 (R. at 279-299)
Final Order on Reconsideration, October 11, 2002
(R. at 34-40)
iv

1-21
22-28

3.
4.

Order of Summary Judgment, December 4,2002
(R. at 5-9)

29-33

Appeal No. 88-1676 (Utah State Tax Comm'n 1990)

34-39

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Centennial Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n. 266 F.2d 208 (5th Cir.
1959). cert, denied. 361 U.S. 827 (1959)

28

Gould v. Gould. 245 U.S. 151 (1917)

32

Wall v. United Gas Public Serv. Co.. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934)

28

State Cases
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 796 P.2d 1256
(Utah 1990)

34

Atlas Steel. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 61 P.3d 1053 (Utah 2002)

1, 24, 33

Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm'n. 845 P.2d 266 (Utah App.),
cert, denied. 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993)
Business Aviation of South Dakota. Inc. v. Medivest. Inc.. 882 P.2d 662

29, 31

(Utah 1994)

25, 31

Butler v. State Tax Comm'n. 13 Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 852 (Utah 1962)

21, 23

Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Comm'n. 791 P.2d 511
(Utah 1990)

22

Cole v. Jordan School District. 899 P.2d 776 (Utah 1995)

34

County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n. 944 P.2d 370 (Utah 1997)

21, 23-25, 32

E.C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 168 P.2d 324 (Utah 1946)

15, 16

Industrial Communications. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 12 P.3d 87
(Utah 2000)
vi
Merrill Bean Chevrolet. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 549 P.2d 443 (Utah 1976)

21, 33
17

Morton International. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991)

31

Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n. 34 P.3d 180 (Utah 2001)

1

Robert H. Hincklev. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 17 Utah 2d 70, 404
P.2d 662 (1965)
Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co.. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 987 P.2d 594
(Utah 1999)
Salt Lake County ex rel. v. State Tax Comm'n ex rel.. 779 P.2d 1131
(Utah 1989)

17
1, 20
21, 25

Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Division of Utah State Tax Comm'n.
846 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1993)

16, 17

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-101(7)

5

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-205

4, 13, 15-18, 35

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-602

1

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604

20

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610

1, 3,17, 20, 21

Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-101 through 215 (Utah's Severance Tax Act)

6

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101

4, 5, 27, 30

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102

4, 26

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103

4, 30-31

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1021(19)

26

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14

1
vii

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16

4

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2

1

Rules
Utah Admin. Code R861-1A-5(E) (1993-1997)
Utah Admin. Code R861-1A-21 (1998)

18, 19
1, 5,13,16

Other
The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 627 (1983)

26

Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1233 (5th Ed. 1979)

26

Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1430 (5th Ed. 1979)

27

H. William and C. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms, p. 1013 (9th ed. 1994) . . . . 26
H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law. Vol. 8, p. 1205
(Lexis Publishing 2000)

27

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 648 (Deluxe Ed. 1998)

27

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 1459 (Deluxe Ed. 1998)

27

Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 2098 (Deluxe Ed. 1998)

27

Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion No. 82-06, p. 5 (Sept. 2,1982)

28

Vlll

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §§ 59-1-602, 78-2-2 and 63-46b-14 (1953 as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

ISSUE FOR REVIEW: Did the Commission err in relying on Utah

Admin. Code R861-1A-21.B (1998) ("Rule 2 LB") to decide that it could impose an
increased severance tax based on a split decision of the Commission when the controlling
statute does not permit the Commission to act unless a majority of the Commissioners
concur?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a legal issue to which there has
been no explicit statutory grant of discretion given to the Commission to interpret the
subject statutory provisions. Accordingly, this legal issue is to be reviewed under a
correction of error standard giving no deference to the determination made by the
Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (1953 as amended)1; Atlas Steel. Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n. 61 P.3d 1053, 1057 (Utah 2002); Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n. 34
P.3d 180, 186 (Utah 2001); and Salt Lake Citv Southern R.R. Co.. Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n. 987 P.2d 594, 596 (Utah 1999).

' Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the Utah Code Annotated are to the
1953 edition as amended.
1

PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The Commission's Final Order on
Reconsideration is based on its determination that the Commission may act with a 2-2 tie
vote of the Commissioners and that the Division was the prevailing party. (R. at 34 and
see R. at 240 and 174).
2.

ISSUE FOR REVIEW: If the Court upholds Rule 21 .B, did the

Commission err in not recognizing ExxonMobil as the prevailing party when Utah law
requires the Division to overcome the statutory presumption against taxation and the
Division failed to convince a majority of the Commissioners that its statutory
interpretation was correct?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a legal issue to which there has
been no explicit statutory grant of discretion given to the Commission to interpret the
subject statutory provisions. Accordingly, this legal issue is to be reviewed under a
correction of error standard giving no deference to the determination made by the
Commission. Id.
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The Commission's Final Order on
Reconsideration is based on its determination that the Commission may act with a 2-2 tie
vote of the Commissioners and that the Division was the prevailing party. (R. at 34 and
see R. at 240 and 174).
3.

ISSUE FOR REVIEW: Did the Commission err when it concluded

that the language, "shall pay to the state a severance tax equal to 4% of the value, at the

2

well, of the oil or gas produced," means that Utah's severance tax should be imposed at
the point oil and gas is sold rather than when it is severed from the earth?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a legal issue to which there has
been no explicit statutory grant of discretion given to the Commission to interpret the
subject statutory provisions. Accordingly, this legal issue is to be reviewed under a
correction of error standard giving no deference to the determination made by the
Commission. Id.
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: The Commission's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Final Decision is based on its interpretation of the severance tax
statutes. (R. at 279 and see R. at 364 and 559).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
determinative of issues in this appeal.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610:
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings
commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court shall:
(a) grant the commission deference concerning
its written findings of fact, applying a substantial
evidence standard on review; and
(b) grant the commission no deference
concerning its conclusions of law, applying a
correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit
grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue
before the appellate court.
3

(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16
pertaining to judicial review of formal adjudicative
proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-205:
The governor shall designate one of the members of
the commission as chairperson. Three members of the
commission constitute a quorum for the transaction of
business. The commission shall be in session and open for
the transaction of business during ordinary business hours
each day. The commission may hold sessions or conduct
investigations at any place in the state to facilitate the
performance of its duties.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a):
Each person owning an interest, working interest,
royalty interest, payment out of production, or any other
interest, in oil or gas produced from a well in the state, or in
the proceeds of the production, shall pay to the state a
severance tax equal to 4% of the value, at the well, of the oil
or gas produced, saved, and sold or transported from the field
where the substance was produced.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(19):
"Value at the well" means the value of oil or gas at the
point production is completed.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20):
"Well or wells" means any extractive means from
which oil or gas is produced or extracted, located within an
oil or gas field, and operated by one person.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103(1):
For purposes of computing the severance lax, the
value of oil or gas at the well is the value established under
4

an arm's-length contract Ibi the pui chase of production at the
well, or in the absence of such a contract, by the \ alue
established in accordance with the first applicable of the
following methods:
(a) the value at the well established under a
non-arm's-length contract for the purchase of
production at the well, provided that the value is
equivalent to the value received under comparable
arm's-length contracts for purchases or sales of likequality oil or gas in the same field;
(b) the value at the well determined by
consideration of information relevant in valuing likequality oil or gas at the well in the same field or nearby
fields or areas such as: posted prices, prices received
in arm's-length spot sales, or other reliable public
sources of price or market information;
(c) the value established using the net-back
method as defined in Section 59-5- i 01
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-101(7):
"Net-back method" means a method tor calculating the
fair market value of oil or gas at the well. Under this method,
costs of transportation, not to exceed 50% of the value of the
oil or gas, and processing shall be deducted from the
proceeds received for the oil or gas and any extracted or
processed products, or from the value of the oil or gas or any
extracted or processed products at thefirstpoint at which the
fair-market value for those products is determined by a sale
pursuant to an arm's-length contract or comparison to other
sales of those products. Processing and transportation costs
shall be deducted only from the value of the processed or
transported product.
Utah Admin. Code R861-1A-21 (1998):
\ \ quorum of the commission must participa i
any order which constitutes final agency action on an
adjudicative matter.

5

B. The party charged with the burden of proof or the
burden of overcoming a statutory presumption shall prevail
only if a majority of the participating commissioners rules in
that party's favor.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This case is an appeal of a decision of the Utah State Tax Commission

regarding which party prevails in the event the four member Commission renders a split
decision. Petitioner is appealing both the validity of the administrative rule relied on by
the Commission to declare the Division the prevailing party and the Commission's
alleged misapplication of that rule. Because the Commission ruled that its split decision
resulted in a victory for the Division, Petitioner is also appealing the Commission's legal
interpretation of Utah's Severance Tax Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-101 through 215
(the "Act").
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION AT UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION.
In September 1999, ExxonMobil discovered that it had mistakenly

calculated its Utah severance tax by using the value of its oil and gas at delivery points
that were significantly downstream2 from the well site. (R. at 280). On
2

Oil and gas is severed from the earth at the well site. The oil and gas may be
separated at the well site and sold or it may be transported through gathering lines to
satellite facilities and then to battery facilities where further refining, separating and
treating may occur. The oil and gas may also be sold at the satellites or batteries, or may
be further transported to refineries or other locations through pipelines. Satellites,
6

September j. \ i '**' I ^MUH' Inlnl i n L in pulled a refund of excess severance taxes it
bel^

joiieously paid during the period from Janu.r

* ] Q93 through

December 31,1998 (the "Audit Period"). (R. at 281). On May

..

issued a Statutory Notice in which it denied I/AAOHII \U

>

•

!

' • -<ou

and JKI) LXMHIMCI'I' imuT Hni ;i peMMnii in which it requested that the Commission
(«i I inlerpivl the severance tax statutes to determine at what point oil and gas production
is "at the well" for Utah severance tax purposes, and (b) determine the value of
ExxonMobil's oil and gas at whatever poii in was deemul in In ilu ruinvf pnn i for
valuau

2001, the Commission entered an Order in

which It bifurcated the two issues. (R. al 573).
On December 18, 2001, the Commission conducted a ioniu
receive evidence and legal argumeiu on d< llisi i ^IM inerpiviinu the statutory meaning
il 19, 2002, the Commission issued its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision ("Final Decision") on the first
bifurcated issue. (R, at 279) The Commissioners were not uniform m llien
interpretation of the severance ...

.

missioners wrote a

separate npiun m "! i unnussioner Pam Hendrickson wrote the opinion of the Commission
and Palmer DePaulis wrote a concurrence. Commissioners Hendrickson and DePaulis

batteries and pipelines are generally referred to as "downstream locations. See
Statement of Facts, infra pp. 1 <»- -".
7

concluded that the statute was ambiguous and that oil and gas "production is complete"
when it is sold. Thus, they rejected ExxonMobil's interpretation that oil and gas
production was complete when it was severed from the earth at the well. Commissioners
Hendrickson and DePaulis concluded that the point of valuation for severance tax
purposes could be at various different locations wherever the production was sold.
Commissioners R. Bruce Johnson and Marc B. Johnson3 disagreed with Commissioners
Hendrickson and DePaulis and concluded that the statute was not ambiguous and that oil
and gas production was complete when the oil or gas was "produced or extracted" from
the earth at the well site. (R. at 279). The Commission named the Division the
prevailing party.
On May 8, 2002, ExxonMobil filed a Request for Reconsideration of the
April 19,2002 Decision claiming that a tie vote of the four Commissioners should be
interpreted in the taxpayer's favor and that ExxonMobil should be declared the
"prevailing party." The Request also asserted additional errors in the Commission's

3

Commissioner Marc B. Johnson agreed with the statulory interpretation set forth
"by Commissioner Bruce Johnson in his dissenting opinion." (R. at 294). He advocated
a prospective application of the statutory interpretation. On reconsideration,
Commissioner Marc B. Johnson abandoned this prospective application position and
fully joined "in Commissioner Bruce Johnson's dissent." (R. at 36).
8

jxl

conducted a hearing on the reconsideration •, \

September 19,2002. (R. at 35).
On October 11, 2002, the Commission issued i:
Reconsideration Phnal < Htha I in v, In. !i i( iniflirninl

'

i
-

f

'h it the Division was

. . l d t v a j u e « a t t j i e ^ e ji» re f erre( | t 0 t ^ e

v a i u e af

the

point of sale. (R. at 34). The Commission also directed the continued proceeding in the
matter on the second bifurcated issue. (R. at 34).
OnDecembeM

4nu

IIH i nimmsMnii mini

der of Summary •

Jtiiliiinciil i HI llu' vivond bifurcated issue in which it concluded that the values used b\
ExxonMobil in its original severance tax filing were the prices of the oil and gas at the
multiple sales points. (R. at 5). Because the Commission nau ;
'Value at the well meant llu; punil nl «,(,ilr i,i(liii lli.in ,i ' II 11 le <it the point of extraction
ant) i'*\rniiKi1 I"M ("ommission determined that no refund was due to ExxonMobil and
the agency case was then complete.
On December 16, 2002, ExxonMobil timely filed

HMII

I i I1'." n"11

with this Com i.

4

On May 17, 2002, the Commission granted Phillips Petroleum Company's
motion for leave to file an amicus brief in support of ExxonMobil's Request for
Reconsideration (R at 203),

9

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The issues presented in this case are purely legal issues and matters of

statutory interpretation. Therefore, there are no disputed factual issues presented by this
appeal The basic uncontested facts as set forth by the Commission in its Final Decision
are as follows:
1.

ExxonMobil, owns or operates between 400 to 600 producing oil

and gas wells in the Ratherford and McElmo Creek production areas in the Greater
Aneth Field located in the southeast corner of Utah. (R. at 282).
2.

"The production process for oil and gas first begins at the

production zone below the earth's surface." Id.
3.

"Oil, water and gas emulsion is produced from the production zone

and is extracted and severed from the earth at the wellhead on the surface of the earth."

14
4.

"At the point the oil comes from the ground, it is in an emulsion

containing water, oil, sand, and other impurities referred to as basic sediment and water
("BS&W")." Id
5.

"The oil, water and gas emulsion severed at the wellhead is

frequently referred to as 'total production.1" 14
6.

"In a simple situation, the total production is placed into a simple

storage and/or separator tank at the well site where the BS&W is allowed to settle to the

10

f» ul

the tank. ' I he gas is flared off" or

otherwise separated and gathered for gas processing." i R at 2^ ~ j
7

"Trucks could load oil from the simple storage tank at which \

could be sold and then transported hv inu (*• M» .I leiiiia ' lor (iinlini irfiiiiiiL! " JL^
t sold at the well site, it could be transported
further to a Satellite Facility ("Satellite") where additional heating, treating and
separating could occur." Id
(ill and jzas could In; ;.,uld hum (In Siilrllni. 10 ,i liurk lo.id mil

14
10.

"If the oil was not sold at the Satellite, it could be further transferred

to a Tank Battery Facility ("Battery") for even further refining, separating, treating . i
storage." IdL
11."

"1 lie oil 'ould be metered at [the Battery] and loaded out to a ti uck

or sold into a pipeline." Id
12.

"The oil is marketable at the well *.te. UK. ViiemK ,;!;..

-r

13.

The value of oil and gas at the well site where the production is

(R at 285).

severed from the earth is generally less than the value of the oil and gas at downstream

"There are a number of wells in Utah, which are not owned by ExxonMobil,
that have simple storage tanks set up at the well and they sell their production through a
truck load-out at the well site." (R. at 284),
11

delivery points after processing makes the oil and gas a more refined and valuable
product. Id.
14.

"During the Audit Period, ExxonMobil sold a small percentage of

its oil from individual well sites" and a larger percentage at the Battery. (R. at 283-284).
15.

In September 1999, ExxonMobil discovered that it had mistakenly

calculated its Utah severance tax by using the value of its oil and gas at delivery points
that were significantly downstream from the well site. (R. at 280).
16.

On September 23, 1999, ExxonMobil timely requested a refund of

the excess severance taxes it had erroneously paid.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This appeal involves three main issues: (1) may the Commission impose i
tax based on a split decision when the controlling statute does not permit Commission
action unless a majority of the Commissioners concur, (2) did the Commission err in
declaring the Division the prevailing party when the Division did not overcome the
statutory presumption against taxation because it failed to convince a majority of the
Commissioners that its interpretation was correct, and (3) what is the correct
interpretation of the meaning of "value at the well" as used in Utah's Severance Tax Act?
If the Court determines that ExxonMobil should have been declared the prevailing party
in the administrative proceeding under either of the first two issues then the Court need
not reach the third issue interpreting Utah's Severance Tax Act.

12

E

tl

*

^ s !im: nartv at the administrative

^

proceeding. At the administrative proceeding, E x x o n M o b i l sough! .• \ c a l interpretation
that severance tax should b e imposed on the value of oil and gas "at the well'" i ather than
on the increased value o f t h e oil and gas alKi il luil lii/rii IIMHIM IMIIII Il mil MHIII HI
dovuislreani |pc:itM»

I

i >i \\\r < 't HUPHIVStoners ruled that the tax should be imposed at

the well and two ruled that it should be imposed at the point o f sale. Utah law provides
that the Commission may only act through a majority vote of its Commissioners. Thus,
the decision of the L o\ nmissioners cannot 1 > e 11»11 s 11II i • 111 I • 111 11t il I 111t < i»1111111 s «•, mi 11
a i itli :)i: izliig the imposition of SG\ ei ance tax at the higher valuation amount, and
ExxonMobil's interpretation should prevail until a majority o f t h e Commission decides
that the tax may be imposed at the point of sale

1 he Commission refused to accept

result and asserted thai it was auflioti/nl l», us own .liliiiiiiisti.ifh c nil
<

I Idih \ i l i i n

though it could only achieve a tie vote. It is well

established that an administrative rule cannot circumvent the requirement o f t h e
governing statute. As a result, the Commission cannot avoid the statutory requirement of
a majority decision by lr\nig lo eslahhsh ,i "cssn \ inii 1 slaml \!\l , l in , , i n li i n
- 1 .B should thus be stricken as unauthorized under Utah C o d e
Ann. § 59-1-205 and ExxonMobil should be declared to be the prevailing party.
Assuming arguendo m ^ K „ : , .. .B is upneia ana tounu
-.

oui

,

.

13

Jt

••

'}

-•-

••

^burden

of overcoming a statutory presumption" set forth in the rule. Rule 21 .B provides that the
"party charged with the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory
presumption shall prevail only if a majority of the participating commissioners rules in
that party's favor." This case involves a legal question of statutory interpretation. Thus,
there is no factual "burden of proof' on either party, but instead a "burden of overcoming
a statutory presumption." The issue presented here is the interpretation of the severance
tax statute. It is well established under Utah law that taxing statutes are to be interpreted
in favor of taxpayers and against taxation. Thus, it is the Auditing Division, not
ExxonMobil, that bears a "burden of overcoming the statutory presumption" against
taxing oil and gas at the higher valuation point. The Division only obtained two votes
and thus did not overcome this presumption. The Court should reverse the
Commission's decision that the Division was the prevailing party.
As to the correct interpretation of the meaning of "value at the well" as
used in Utah's Severance Tax Act, Commissioner Pam Hendrickson's and Palmer
DePaulis' decisions did not follow the established rules of statutory construction: (1) to
look first to the plain meaning of the language, (2) to ensure that the interpretation is in
harmony with the statutory provisions as a whole, and (3) to interpret ambiguities in tax
statutes in favor of the taxpayer. When these standard rules of construction are applied,
as they were by Commissioners R. Bruce Johnson and Marc B. Johnson, it becomes clear
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that "production is complete" at the well and not at a point of sale that may be
significantly downstream.
ARGUMENT
I.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULE 2 LB RELIED ON BY THE
COMMISSION TO DECLARE THE DIVISION THE PREVAILING
PARTY IS UNENFORCEABLE BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS WITH
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT THE COMMISSION
ACT AS A QUORUM TO ENFORCE TAX OBLIGATIONS.
The Tax Commission is a creature of statute and only has those powers

which are conferred upon it by statute. E.C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 168 P.2d
324, 328 (Utah 1946). Utah law requires that all actions by the Commission be
performed by a quorum of the Commissioners. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-205. According
to the Utah Supreme Court, this means "when four commissioners of the Tax
Commission are present, three must agree to constitute an act of the Commission." E.C.
Olsen Co.. 168 P.2d at 328 (emphasis added). Rendering a decision as to the tax liability
of the petitioners constitutes an act whether the petitioner is seeking a refund or the
Division is seeking enforcement of an assessment.
On December 18, 2001, the Commission sat as a full body and conducted a
formal hearing in this matter. The issue before the Commission was whether the Utah
law imposing severance tax required the amount of tax to be based on the value of the oil
and gas when it is severed from the earth at the well, as argued by ExxonMobil, or
whether it should be based on the value of the gas where it is actually sold, as argued by
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the Division. Two of the Commissioners agreed with ExxonMobil's interpretation of the
statute and the other two adopted the Division's position.
Under § 59-1-205 and E.C. Olsen Co., ExxonMobil should have been
named the prevailing party. Only two of the Commissioners believed that the Division
was correct in its interpretation of the statute. Agreement by only two commissioners
does not constitute a quorum and a tax cannot be enforced where the Commission has
failed to act as a quorum. E.C. Olsen Co., 168 P.2d at 328.
Despite the absence of a quorum, the Commission named the Division as
the prevailing party. This conclusion was not based on the governing statute, but on the
administrative rule which directly conflicts with the governing statute. Rule 21 reads as
follows:
A.

A quorum of the commission must participate in any
order which constitutes final agency action on an
adjudicative matter.

B.

The party charged with the burden of proof or the
burden of overcoming a statutory presumption shall
prevail only if a majority of the participating
commissioners rules in that party's favor.

Utah Admin. Rules R861-1 A-21. According to the Commission, Rule 21 .B dictated that
"Petitioner would need three commissioners to find in its favor in order to prevail."
Final Order, p. 4. (R. at 35).
This Court has long held that administrative rules which conflict with their
governing statutes are unenforceable. Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Division of Utah
16

State Tax Comm'n. 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993); Merrill Bean Chevrolet, Inc. v.
State Tax Comm'n. 549 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1976); Robert H. Hincklev. Inc. v. State
Tax Comm'n. 17 Utah 2d 70, 77, 404 P.2d 662, 668 (1965). Moreover, an agency
cannot alter the effect of a statute by adopting administrative rules which purport to
interpret a statute. Sanders Brine Shrimp. 846 P.2d at 1305 ("Questions of statutory
construction are matters of law, and we give no deference to an administrative agency's
interpretation of a statute.").6
Before 1998, the administrative rule adopted pursuant to § 59-1-205, and in
effect for more than twenty years, provided that in the event of a tie, "the position of the
petitioning taxpayer will be deemed to have prevailed." This rule appears to have been
consistent with the governing statute because it required an act by a quorum of the
Commission before it could impose or enforce a tax liability. Despite the fact that there
had been no change to the governing statute, the Commission amended the rule in 1998,
effectively changing the outcome in cases resulting in a tie vote.
In a recent open meeting before the Legislature's Administrative Rules
Review Committee, one of the Commissioners admitted that there is no statutory
authority for this amendment:
Committee Member: Can you show us in the statute where
you have the authority to say tie goes to the tax assessor?

6

A court will only defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute when the statute
contains "an explicit grant of discretion." Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b).
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Tax Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson: The statutes are pretty
much silent on that. There's a provision that says if the
petitioner, the taxpayer, doesn't bring any evidence forward
on equalization that the property would be deemed to be
equalized. But other than that, pretty much it's, the statutes
are silent.
Administrative Rules Review Committee Meeting, (January 14, 2003).
The governing statute simply does not provide the agency with discretion
to alter, by rule, which party will be the prevailing party in the event of a tie.
Nevertheless, in this case the Commission has applied Rule 21 .B to deprive ExxonMobil
of the victory it would have had under § 59-1-205. In its Final Order, the Commission
admitted that the clear result under the former rule was that ExxonMobil would have
been the prevailing party:
This leads to the issue of which side prevails in the event of a
tie among the Commissioners. Prior to 1998, the Tax
Commission rules were clear as to which party prevailed in
the event of a tie. Utah Admin. Rule R861-1 A-5(E) (1997)
stated in pertinent part,' If the Commission vote results in a
tie vote on any matter, the position of the petitioning taxpayer
[ExxonMobil] will be deemed to have prevailed . . . .
Final Order, p. 3 (R. at 37).7

7

It should be noted that the tax at issue in this matter is for the tax years 1993
through 1998. Thus, the "old rule" was the rule in place during five of the six years at
issue. The old rule read as follows:
"all formal adjudicative proceedings will be decided by a
quorum of the commissioners.... If the Commission vote
results in a tie vote on any matter, the position of the
petitioning taxpayer will be deemed to have prevailed, and
18

The governing statute does not give the Commission discretion to change
the outcome of an agency proceeding by amending its rules. The governing statute
requires a majority vote to impose an increased tax. Because the rule conflicts with the
governing statute and is unauthorized, it is unenforceable and should be stricken.
IL

THE COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT NAMED THE DIVISION
THE PREVAILING PARTY BECAUSE THE DIVISION, NOT
EXXONMOBIL, BORE THE BURDEN OF OVERCOMING A
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION.
Even if the Court concludes that Rule 21.B is harmonious with the

governing statute, the Commission erred in concluding that ExxonMobil did not prevail
because it bore "the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory
presumption." Rule 21.B implicitly acknowledges that issues before the Commission fit
within two categories: (1) legal issues where a statute is presumed to favor either the
taxpayer or the taxing entity, or (2) factual issues where one party is charged with the
burden of proof. The "burden of overcoming a statutory presumption" and the "burden
of proof' are not the same thing. Nevertheless, the Commission used the terms
interchangeably, ultimately reaching the wrong conclusion.8

the Commission will publish the decision."
Utah Admin. Code R861-1 A-5.E (1993-1997).
8

On page 4 of the Final Order, the Commission held, "It is the Commission's
conclusion from the briefing and oral argument on this issue that Petitioner is the party
charged with the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory presumption."
(R. at 37).
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The Commission held that ExxonMobil did not prevail because (1) it was
"the party seeking affirmative relief," and (2) "the issue of [at] what point the oil and gas
is to be valued for severance tax purposes is a question of both law and fact." (R. at 38).
The first basis for the Commission's conclusion appears to be grounded in
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604, a procedural statute governing judicial review of
administrative proceedings which requires the "parties seeking affirmative relief to bear
the burden of proof.9 Not only is § 59-1-604 inapplicable to the proceeding before the
Commission, but § 59-1-610, a related statute, requires that the Commission's decision
be given no deference when a legal issue is under review. Thus, there is no "burden of
proof even at the appellate level in matters of statutory interpretation. Instead, there is a
statutory "presumption" which either favors or disfavors the party seeking a correct
interpretation.
The issue of statutory interpretation before the Commission in this case is -what is the correct interpretation of "value at the well." ExxonMobil characterized this
issue as a question of law because it is a straightforward issue of statutory interpretation.
The Commission concluded, without explanation, that "the issue of what point the oil

9

In Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 987 P.2d 594
(Utah 1999), this Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604 to require a taxpayer to
bear the burden of proof only when the taxpayer was challenging the Commission's
factual findings. The Commission was given no deference on matters of statutory
interpretation or "questions of law." In fact, the only exception to that rule is when the
statute being interpreted contains "an explicit grant of discretion." Id. at 596, n. 2,
quoting Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b).
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and gas is to be valued for severance tax purposes is a question of both law and fact."
Final Order, p. 5. The only way the issue could be one of fact and thereby merit a lesser
standard of review is if the statute contained "an explicit grant of discretion." Utah Code
Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b). Because there is no explicit grant of discretion to the
Commission, the interpretation of "value at the well" is a legal issue subject to traditional
rules of statutory construction.
Utah law is well-established that, in matters of statutory interpretation, tax
statutes are always construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Industrial
Communications. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 12 P.3d 87, 91 (Utah 2000)(As a
"general rule [the] tax statutes and any ambiguities therein are to be construed liberally in
favor of the taxpayer."); County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n. 944 P.2d 370, 375 (Utah 1997), quoting, Salt Lake County ex rel. v. State
Tax Comm'n ex reL 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989)("Our practice is to construe
taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the legislature to clarify an
intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists.").10
Despite this well-established statutory presumption in favor of the taxpayer,
the Commission concluded that ExxonMobil bore a "burden of proof' because,

10

The only exception to this rule of statutory presumption is where a taxpayer
claims the benefit of an exemption. In those cases, the presumption is in favor of
taxation. Butler v. State Tax Comm'n. 13 Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 852 (Utah 1962). No
such exemption claim is involved in this case.
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regardless of the correct statutory interpretation, ExxonMobil would be required to pay
some severance tax:
[Cjlearly the severance tax is applicable, that is not the
dispute. The dispute is what point in the production process
should the oil and gas be valued in order to determine the
amount of the severance tax . . . . [I]t is the Commission's
conclusion that the issue of what point the oil and gas is to be
valued for severance tax purposes is a question of both law
and fact.
Final Order, p. 5 (R. at 38). The fact that a taxpayer will have some liability under a
taxing statute does not alter the statutory presumption.
In Chris & Dick's Lumber and Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511
(Utah 1990), the taxpayer challenged the Commission's interpretation of a statute
imposing a penalty for the late filing of prepayments related to its sales tax returns. The
Commission levied a ten percent penalty of almost $10,000 on the taxpayer's late
payment. The taxpayer argued that the statutory language "10% . . . due from the date
the prepayment return is due" created an interest charge of less than $1,000. Even
though the taxpayer would have some liability under either interpretation, the Court
recognized that this issue of statutory construction was a "matter[] of law for the courts."
Id at 513.
Just like the taxpayer in Chris & Dick's, ExxonMobil is seeking an
interpretation of statutory language. Despite the fact that ExxonMobil will pay severance
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tax under either interpretation of "value at the well/' Utah law still recognizes a
presumption in favor of the taxpayer:
It is an established rule in the construction of tax statutes that
if any doubt exists as to the meaning of the statute, our
practice is to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of
the taxpayer leaving it to the Legislature to clarify an intent to
be more restrictive if such intent exists.
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County, 944 P.2d at 375. Because
ExxonMobil's interpretation would only reduce rather than eradicate its tax liability, the
Commission, without any legal precedent, chose to ignore the statutory presumption
favoring the taxpayer and held that ExxonMobil had failed to meet its "burden of proof."
The Commission based its decision that ExxonMobil bore the burden of
proof on Butler v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 367 P.2d 852 (Utah 1962). However, Butler
expressly recognizes that the taxing entity bears the burden of proving the applicability of
a taxing statute. Once this burden has been met, the Court explained that "[t]he burden
then shifted to the plaintiff to prove the transactions came within the exemptions as it
claims." IdL at 854 (emphasis added). ExxonMobil's contention that it is entitled to a
refund of severance taxes paid does not depend on a tax exemption. Accordingly, the
burden never shifted to the taxpayer. Instead, the Division continues to bear the burden
of overcoming the statutory presumption in favor of taxpayers. County Bd. of
Equalization of Wasatch County. 944 P.2d at 375.
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Under the administrative rule relied on by the Commission to declare the
Division the victor in the proceeding below, the Division bore the burden of overcoming
the statutory presumption. The Division was only able to persuade two Commissioners
to agree with its interpretation of the severance tax statute. Rule 21 .B requires a majority
of three before the Division can be declared the prevailing party. Because two
Commissioners concluded that the Division failed to overcome the statutory
presumption, ExxonMobil should be declared the prevailing party in this matter and the
opinions of Commissioners R. Bruce Johnson and Marc B. Johnson should be viewed as
the decision of the Commission on the bifurcated issue.
III.

IF THE COURT DOES NOT CONCLUDE THAT EXXONMOBIL IS
THE PREVAILING PARTY, THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE
THE COMMISSION'S RULING THAT "VALUE AT THE WELL"
MEANS THE "POINT OF SALE" BECAUSE THIS RULING
VIOLATES THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
In this matter, the Commission interpreted the meaning of Utah's severance

tax statutes. This Court has previously ruled that a statutory interpretation by the
Commission constitutes "a conclusion of law [to which] we grant no deference and
review for correctness." Atlas Steel Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 61 P.3d 1053 (Utah
2002). When the Court conducts a review such as this, it applies the following standard
rules of statutory construction:
1.

The Court looks "first to the plain language of the statute." County

Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County, 944 P.2d at 373 (citations omitted).
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2.

The Court interprets the "terms of a statute . . . as a comprehensive

whole and not in piecemeal fashion." Business Aviation of South Dakota. Inc. v.
Medivest Inc.. 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994).
3.

"[I]f any doubt exists as to the meaning of the statute, 'our practice

is to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of the taxpayer, leaving it to the
legislature to clarify an intent to be more restrictive if such intent exists.'" County Bd. of
Equalization of Wasatch County. 944 P.2d at 373-374, quoting, Salt Lake County v.
State Tax Comm'n. 779 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1989).
A review of the Commission's Final Decision reveals that it did not apply
these standard rules of construction in its analysis of the subject statute. Moreover, the
Commission's interpretation results in disparate treatment of similarly situated taxpayers
by imposing severance tax at the wellhead in some instances, while in other instances it
would impose the tax downstream where the value of oil and gas is higher because it
includes costs of processing and/or transportation.
A.

The Plain Language of the Severance Tax Act Requires That
ExxonMobil's Oil and Gas Production Be Valued "At the Well."
Rather than at Some Other Downstream Point of Sale.

The first crucial point which provides context for this issue is that the tax at
issue in this case is a severance tax, not a sales tax. In contrast to a sales tax which is
calculated on a sales price which may include manufacturing, transportation and other
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costs, a severance tax is imposed on the value of a product when it is "severed" or
separated from the earth whether it is sold or not.11
The plain language of the Act requires that severance tax be imposed on
the 'Value" of oil and gas "produced" and not on the "sales price" of oil and gas "sold:"
"severance tax [shall be] equal to 4% of the value, at the
well, of the oil and gas produced"
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a)(emphasis added). "Value at the well" is defined as
"the value of oil or gas at the point production is completed." Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-5-1021(19). The Final Decision adopted by the Commission reflects a
misunderstanding of the nature of the severance tax and the Legislature's plain use of the
word "production."
According to the Commission, the Legislature "defined 'at the well' to
mean something other than simply the well or well site" because the Legislature used the
phrase "at the point production is completed." Final Decision, p.l 1 (R. at 289).
However, if one reviews the provisions of the Act, it is clear that the Legislature uses the
word "production" synonymously with the word "extraction" to refer to the process of
severing the oil or gas from the earth. For example, "well" is defined as "any extractive

11

Severance taxes are "usually regarded as a form of property taxation" that is
imposed on petroleum and mineral production "at the time they are removed or severed
from the soil." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1233 (5th Ed. 1979); and H. William and C.
Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms, p. 1013 (9th ed. 1994) (severance tax is "a tax on
the removal of minerals from the ground"). "Severance" means the "the act or process of
severing." The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 627 (1983).
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means from which oil or gas is produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field,
and operated by one person."12 Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20) (emphasis added).
ExxonMobil asserts that the plain meaning of these provisions clearly provides that the
oil or gas should be valued for severance tax purpose when it is "produced" and that
under the definition of Subsection-20 that is at the "well."
The plain meaning of "production" is the "act of producing," and in this
context "producing" means to extract or "bring out" by "physical effort." MerriamWebster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 648 (Deluxe Ed. 1998).13 Accordingly, one is
"producing" oil or gas when he is physically extracting or bringing the oil or gas out of
the earth where it had been captured in the reservoir. When is the "act of producing"
(i.e., production) complete? Quite simply, when the oil or gas is liberated or severed
from the earth at the well, hence the name "severance tax." It is "at the well" that the oil
or gas is no longer physically attached with the earth and it becomes a separate item of

12

Black's Law Dictionary defines "well" to mean "[a] hole or shaft sunk into the
earth in order to obtain a fluid, such as water, oil, brine, or natural gas, from a
subterranean supply." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1430 (5th Ed. 1979); see also
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, p. 2098 (Deluxe Ed. 1998)("a shaft or hole
sunk to obtain oil, brine or gas"), and H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law. Vol.
8, p. 1205 (Lexis Publishing 2000)("An orifice in the ground made . . . for the purpose of
obtaining any petroleum or gas.").
13

According to Webster, "extract" means: "to withdraw (as a juice or fraction) by
physical or chemical process," and "produce" means "to compose, create, or bring out by
intellectual or physical effort." See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, pp. 648
and 1459.
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tangible property capable of separate ownership, transportation and alienation.14
Centennial Oil Co. v. Federal Power ComnTn. 266 F.2d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 827 (1959)("[I]n the ordinary sense of the terms production of the gas
has been completed at or just above the surface of the ground.") (emphasis added).
Not only did the Commission's Final Decision fail to apply the plain
language standard, but it also ignored its own prior decision that followed this plain
language. In Appeal No. 88-1676, the Commission was asked to review whether an
arm's-length contract for the purchase of oil and gas at a point away from the wellhead
could be used as the actual value of the oil and gas for purpose of the severance tax. The
Commission rejected the use of this third party contract because it did not establish the
value of the oil and gas at the "top of the wells:"
[The Act] requires the value of oil and gas to be set at the
well.... Under the clear and literal meaning of [the Act], at
the well means the gross value of those products at the point
of their removal from the well It does not mean the price
obtained at some point downstream after deducting costs
incurred for transportation, fractionation, and marketing fees.
The position of the Petitioners also does not account for
'shrinkage,' or product which is lost in the process, because
the quantities which are sold are smaller than the quantities
which come through the meters at the top of the wells.

14

See Utah Attorney General Informal Opinion No. 82-06, p. 5 (Sept. 2, 1982)
(extraction of oil and gas at the wellhead is the time at which oil and gas is produced and
becomes a "commodity" to which "title vests"), citing Wall v. United Gas Public Serv.
Co.. 152 So. 561 (La. 1934).
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Appeal No. 88-1676, p. 4 (Utah State Tax Comm'n 1990) (emphasis added).15 As
evidenced by this case, the severance tax is not a tax on the value at a point of sale,
wherever that may be. The severance tax is imposed on the value of the oil and gas at the
moment it is extracted from the earth.
The Utah Court of Appeals decision in Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax
Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266 (Utah App.), cert denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) also
supports the interpretation that production is complete "at the well" and not at some place
further downstream. In Belnorth, the Court of Appeals ruled that severance tax
reimbursements received by a well operator as part of a contractual sales price are not to
be included in the value of the oil and gas production "at the well." The court clarified
that "value at the well" only means the value of the oil and gas production "itself."
"Value at the well" is not equal to a contractual purchase price that may compensate the
seller for other values received for post production costs such as severance taxes,
transportation costs, gathering costs, etc. 14 at p. 270.
Based on the plain language of the statute, the "production" of oil and gas
is "complete" when it is "severed" or "extracted" from the earth. Accordingly, the point
of valuation is the point of severance which is at the mouth of the well before any post
production processes and costs are applied.

15

A copy of this appeal is attached hereto in the Addendum.
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B.

The Commission's Decision That"Value at the Well" Means the
"Point of Sale" Is Not in Harmony w ith Other Provisions of the
Severance Tax Act.

The Commission's Final Decision ignores other provisions of the Act and
renders them meaningless. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103 "Valuation of oil
and or gas." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103 provides that the "value of oil or gas at the well
is the value established under an arm's-length contract for the purchase of the production
at the well." If there is no such arm's-length contract, however, Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-5-103 identifies three additional valuation methods that may be used to try to
identify the value of the oil and gas at the well:
(a) the value at the well established under a non-arm'slength contract for the purchase of production at the well,
provided that the value is equivalent to the value received
under comparable arm's-length contracts for purchases or
sales of like-quality oil or gas in the same field;
(b) the value at the well determined by consideration
of information relevant in valuing like-quality oil or gas at the
well in the same field or nearby fields or areas such as: posted
prices, prices received in arm's-length spot sales, or other
reliable public sources of price or market information;
(c) the value established using the net-back method as
defined in Section 59-5-101.16
If the Commission's interpretation is correct that the oil and gas should be
valued at the "point of sale," why would any of the above valuation methods be

16

The "'net-back method' means a method for calculating the fair market value of
oil or gas at the well. Under this method, costs of transportation . . . and processing shall
be deducted from the proceeds received for the oil or gas and any extracted or processed
products [at their downstream sales location]." Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(7).
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necessary? They would not be. One would just wait until they sell their production, and
there would be no need to try to estimate the value of the oil or gas back to the point it
was produced at the well.17
The Commission's "point of sale" interpretation is not consistent with this
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-103 and thus violates the rule of statutory
construction that requires that the interpretation not be "piecemeal" and that it be in
harmony with all of the provisions of the statute. Morton International Inc. v. Auditing
Division of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991)(A "rule of
statutory construction . . . provides that terms of a statute are to be interpreted as a
comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion."); see also Business Aviation of
South Dakota. Inc. v. Medivest. Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994).
C.

If the Court Determines That the Severance Tax Act Is
Ambiguous. Utah Law Requires That the Act Be Interpreted
Liberally in Favor of the Taxpayer.

"In case of doubt," taxing statutes are "construed in favor of the taxpayer
so as to avoid the levying of taxes by implication." Belnorth. 845 P.2d at 271, n.8. If the
Commission had any doubt about the meaning of Utah's severance tax statutes, those
doubts should have been construed in favor of ExxonMobil and against the Division:

17

The Commission's interpretation that oil and gas should be valued at the "point
of sale" in essence converts the severance tax into a sales tax. By making the severance
tax a sales tax, all of the statutory provisions relating to "value" of the oil or gas are
rendered meaningless because a sales tax does not care about value, but only the "sales"
or "transaction" price.
31

It is an established rule in the construction of tax statutes that
if any doubt exists as to the meaning of the statute, our
practice is to construe taxation statutes liberally in favor of
the taxpayer leaving it to the Legislature to clarify an intent to
be more restrictive if such intent exist.
County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 944 P.2d at
374; see also Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917)("In the interpretation of statutes
levying taxes, it is the established rule not to extend their provisions, by implication,
beyond the clear import of the language used, or to enlarge their operation so as to
embrace matters not specifically pointed out. In case of doubt they are construed most
strongly against the government, and in favor of the citizen.").
The Commission concluded that the statute was ambiguous because the
Legislature did not define the phrase "production is completed." (R. at 289). Rather
than apply long-standing principles of statutory interpretation to interpret this alleged
ambiguity, the Commission concluded that the Legislature was "tacitly leaving it up to
the Tax Commission . . . to interpret the phrase." Id (emphasis added). The
Commission then deferred to its Division's interpretation that the production of oil and
gas was not complete until it was "actually sold" and concluded that the Division's
interpretation was "a permissible interpretation and not unreasonable" particularly in
light of "past administrative practices" by the Division. Id.
When there is an ambiguity in a statute, as the Commission concluded there
was in this case, Utah law requires courts to interpret the ambiguities in favor of the
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taxpayer. County Bd. of Equalization of Wasatch County. 944 P.2d at 374. The
Commission acknowledged that ExxonMobil's interpretation was "well-reasoned." (R.
at 291). Yet it rejected ExxonMobil's interpretation of the statute because the Division's
interpretation was "also reasonable and permissible" and was "the one that has been in
use for more than ten years." Id (emphasis added).18
This act by the Commission completely ignored the fact that Utah law
requires an "explicit grant of discretion" from the Legislature before the Commission
may accept its own "permissible interpretation" of an ambiguous provision. Atlas Steel.
Inc.. 61 P.3d at 1057. If there is no "explicit grant of discretion," the Commission must
abide by "the general rule that tax statutes and any ambiguities therein are to be
construed liberally in favor of the taxpayer." Industrial Communications. Inc.. 12 P.3d at
91. Furthermore, the Division's practices had never been reviewed by the Commission
prior to ExxonMobil's appeal and thus could not be characterized as representing the
Commission's "long-settled position" or "policy." (R. at 298).19 Because the
18

Ironically, rather than clarify alleged ambiguity, the Commission's decision
creates ambiguity and uncertainty within the Severance Tax Act. Because the
Commission concluded that production is complete at the point of sale, in some instances
that "completion" occurs as soon as the oil and gas is extracted from the well simply
because it is sold there. On the other hand, refined oil and gas is somehow "incomplete"
upon removal from the same well as oil and gas sold at the wellhead because it is going
to be sold at a downstream location. Thus, by focusing on point of sale, the
Commission's decision has removed all certainty and meaning from the phrase
"production is completed."
19

Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson explained, "[W]e have been cited no cases
that would indicate that the Division's position was ever approved by the Commission.
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Commission ignored cardinal rules of statutory interpretation and gave unwarranted
deference to the Division's own practices, the Court should reverse the Commission's
Decision.
D.

The Commission's Interpretation That Production Is Completed
at the Point of Sale Results in Disparate Tax Treatment of
Similarly Situated Taxpayers and Potentially Violates Utah's
Constitution,

As noted in Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson's Dissent, the Commission's
"interpretation does not promote fairness and equity":
Two barrels of oil from the same field with identical
characteristics would be taxed differently if their owners had
different marketing strategies. The owner who chose to add
value by further processing its product would be penalized
with a higher tax burden. Such disparate treatment of
similarly situated taxpayers should be avoided unless the
legislature clearly intends to treat them differently.
Final Decision, p. 19 (R. at 297). Without a clear legislative intent and a rational basis to
treat such taxpayers differently, this type of disparate tax treatment would violate Utah's
constitutional provisions of equal protection and uniform operations of the laws. See
Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1990).
Utah has long followed the "policy to interpret a statute if possible to avoid
potential constitutional conflicts." Cole v. Jordan School District, 899 P.2d 776, 777
(Utah 1995). Consequently, the Court should also reject the Commission's statutory

The lack of published opinions or guidance makes it unlikely that the legislature could be
deemed to be aware of the Division's position." (R. at 298).
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interpretation in this case because the Commission has shown no legislative intent for the
resultant disparate tax treatment and because such a rejection would avoid a potentially
unconstitutional interpretation of the statute.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, ExxonMobil respectfully requests that the Court
enter a decision declaring that the Commission's Rule 2LB is invalid because it is
inconsistent with Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-205 and that ExxonMobil's interpretation
adopted by Commissioner R. Bruce Johnson and Marc B. Johnson is the prevailing
interpretation of the definition of "at the well."
In the alternative, ExxonMobil requests that the Court enter an order
declaring that under Rule 21 .B, the Division bore the burden of "overcoming a statutory
presumption" that the severance tax statutes are to be interpreted in favor of the taxpayer,
ExxonMobil, and that the Division did not overcome this presumption when it failed to
obtain the votes of more than two Commissioners. Thus, ExxonMobil's interpretation of
"value at the well" is the prevailing interpretation.
Finally, if the Court does not rule in ExxonMobil's favor on the tie vote
issues, ExxonMobil requests that the Court apply the standard rules of statutory
construction and enter a decision reversing the Commission's conclusion that "value at
the well" means "the point of sale," and ruling that production is completed when the oil
and gas is severed from the earth at the well.
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DATED this 12th day of March, 2003.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

MM

Attorneys
for Appellant
David J/Crapo
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STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on
December 18, 2001. The hearing was limited to the bifurcated factual and legal issue of what point
the oil and gas was "at the well" for purposes of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a).
This matter was originally filed before the Commission by Petitioner on June 9,2000
as an appeal of Respondent's denial to issue a refund of severance tax. On July 2, 2001, Petitioner
filed a Motion to Bifurcate issues in this matter. Respondent opposed the motion. The motion was
granted in part on August 2,2001, when the Commission ordered that the matter proceed to a Formal
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Hearing on the bifurcated issue of what point in time the oil was "at the well." The Formal Hearing
was scheduled solely for the purposes of hearing this bifurcated issue. At the hearing, Respondent
objected that the matter had been scheduled for a Formal Hearing and requested that it be converted
to an Initial Hearing. Respondents request was denied.
Based upon the pleadings, evidence and testimony presented, the Commission makes
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax at issue in this appeal is Utah's severance tax on oil and gas. Utah

Code Ann. §§ 59-5-101 through 59-5-119.
2.

The period at issue is January 1, 1993 through December 31, 1998.

3.

During the period at issue ExxonMobil operated multiple wells in the

Rutherford and McElmo Creek production areas which are located in the Greater Aneth Field in
Southeast Utah. ExxonMobil Hearing Exhibit No. 3 and Formal Hearing Transcript ("Transcript"),
p. 57.
4.

For purposes of Utah's severance tax, the Division has assigned account

number 7370 to ExxonMobil for its oil and gas production from the Greater Aneth Field. Statutory
Notice, p. 1.
5.

ExxonMobil asserts that during the period at issue it mistakenly calculated its

Utah severance tax for account number 7370 by applying the severance tax to the value of its oil and
gas at delivery points that were significantly downstream from the well site.

2
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6.

The downstream delivery point used for the oil was at the pipeline after the oil

left the battery and passed through the Lease Automatic Custody Transfer meter (aLACTM). The
downstream delivery point used for the gas was at the tailgate of the processing plant.
7.

ExxonMobil asserted that the value of the oil after the LACT and the value of

the gas at the tailgate are higher than the value "at the well."
8.

In calculating the severance tax in its original return, ExxonMobil did not

deduct certain costs that had been added to the value of the oil and gas that ExxonMobil now asserts
were post production costs. ExxonMobil had valued the oil based on arms-length sales on the
original returns.
9.

ExxonMobil recalculated its severance tax by subtracting those costs from the

value of the oil and gas at the point of delivery so as to determine the value of the oil and gas
production "at the well."
10.

On or about September 23, 1999, ExxonMobil timely submitted its revised

calculations to the Division and requested a refund of a portion of the severance tax it had previously
paid.
11.

On May 10, 2000, the Division issued a Statutory Notice in which it denied

ExxonMobil's refund request.
12.

ExxonMobil timely filed a Petition for Redetermination challenging the

Division's Statutory Notice.
13.

At the Formal Hearing, ExxonMobil called one witness, Mr. Jeffrey A.

Lambert, an ExxonMobil employee who was certified as an expert petroleum engineer. Transcript,
3
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p. 40. The Division called three witnesses: Mr. John Baza, a petroleum engineer and Associate
Director of Oil and Gas for the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining; Inge-Lise Goss, a Tax
Manager in the Division; and Bradley Simpson, a former Deputy Director of the Division.
Transcript, p. 220 (Mr. Baza), Transcript, p. 247 (Ms. Goss) and Transcript, p. 254 (Mr. Simpson).
14.

There are approximately 400 to 600 producing oil and gas wells in the

McElmo and Rutherford Units. Transcript, p. 57 (Mr. Lambert). The average depth of the
production zone for these oil and gas wells is approximately 5,000 to 6,000 feet below the earth's
surface. Transcript, p. 43 (Mr. Lambert).
15.

The production process for oil and gas first begins at the production zone

below the earth's surface. See Hearing Exhibit No. 2.
16.

Oil, water and gas emulsion is produced from the production zone and is

extracted and severed from the earth at the wellhead on the surface of the earth. Transcript, pp. 4546 (Mr. Lambert) and Transcript, p. 235 (Mr. Baza). At the point the oil comes from the ground, it is
in an emulsion containing water, oil, sand, and other impurities referred to as basic sediment and
water ("BS&W"). It may also contain various gases including hydrogen sulphide, helium, and
natural gas. Transcript, p. 263-264.
17.

The oil, water and gas emulsion severed at the wellhead is frequently referred

to as "total production." Transcript, p. 44 (Mr. Lambert) and Transcript, p. 227 (Mr. Baza).
18.

For purposes of this decision, we use the term "well" as being synonymous

with "wellhead" and "well site," unless the context indicates otherwise.

4
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19.

Typically the mouth of the well will be covered by a valve structure

commonly referred to as a "Christmas Tree". Transcript, p. 44 (Mr. Lambert). The emulsion that
comes from the well is almost never sold directly from the Christmas Tree. There is generally some
separation either in a simple storage tank or further refining.
20.

In a simple situation, the total production is placed into a simple storage

and/or separator tank at the well site where the BS&W is allowed to settle to the bottom of the tank
with the oil rising to the top tank. The gas is flared off or otherwise separated and gathered for gas
processing. Transcript, p. 48 (Mr. Lambert).
21.

Trucks could load oil from the simple storage tank at which point it could be

sold and then transported by truck to a refinery for further refining. Transcript, pp. 121 and 188 (Mr.
Lambert).
22.

If the oil was not sold at the well site, it could be transported further to a

Satellite Facility ("Satellite") where additional heating, treating and separating could occur.
Transcript, p. 53 (Mr. Lambert). Oil and gas could be sold from the Satellite to a truck load-out.
Transcript, p. 54.
23.

If the oil was not sold at the Satellite, it could be further transferred to a Tank

Battery Facility ("Battery") for even further refining, separating, treating and storage. The oil could
be metered at a LACT and loaded out to a truck or sold into a pipeline. Transcript, pp. 54-55.
24.

During the Audit Period, ExxonMobil sold a small percentage of its oil from

individual well sites in the Rutherford Unit to Giant. Hearing Exhibits 8, 9 and 10.

5
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25.

However, the majority of ExxonMobil's production from the Rutherford and

McElmo Creek units was sold to the pipeline or at the pipeline and not at the individual well sites.
Transcript p. 148.
26.

For that small percentage of product purchased by Giant at the individual well

sites, some was transported via truck to Giant's Bloomfield Refinery in New Mexico. Other amounts
of product purchased at the well site were trucked to Giant's Aneth receiving point where the crude
oil was placed into Giant's pipeline and transported to one of Giant's processing facilities. See
Hearing Exhibit 8, 9 and 10.
27.

When Giant purchased the oil at the well site the price was the Paradox Basin

Sweet Posted Price reduced for: gravity adjustments, treating fees (based upon the percentage of
BS&W), transportation charges, split load fees, and short load fees. See Exhibit 7 through 10. For
example, in Exhibit No. 9, ExxonMobil established that on September 27, 1998, it sold crude oil
from a well in the Rutherford Unit. The starting Paradox Basin Posted Price was $12.79 a barrel.
This price was adjusted by a reduction of $0.06 for gravity. It was further reduced by $1.25 for a
BS&W adjustment and was also reduced by $2.15 for a transportation fee to Giant's refinery at
Bloomfield, New Mexico. The net price paid by Giant for the crude oil was $9.29 at the well. See
Exhibit No. 9 and Transcript, pp. 105-110.
28.

There are a number of wells in Utah, which are not owned by ExxonMobil,

that have simple storage tanks set up at the well and they sell their production through a truck loadout at the well site. Transcript, p. 227 (Mr. Baza); Transcript, p. 250 (Ms. Goss); and Transcript, p.
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283 (Mr. Simpson). A well operator could choose to invest additional capital to further refine the oil
by moving it from the well to a Satellite or a Battery. Transcript, pp. 230-233 (Mr. Baza).
29.

Petitioner does not have permanent well site tanks at any well in the

Rutherford and McElmo Creek areas. Instead, for that small percentage of oil that Petitioner sells at
the well site, the oil was sold from portable tanks called frac tanks which were used occasionally for
testing or if there had been some disturbance to the normal process. Transcript p. 95-96.
30.

The simple tank set up at the well is part of the well site, but neither the

Satellite nor the Battery are part of the well site. Transcript, p. 244 (Mr. Baza).
31.

A well could be operated by one person, but a Satellite or Battery would

generally require multiple people to operate them. Transcript, p, 236 (Mr. Baza); see also Transcript,
pp. 202-204 (Mr. Lambert).
32.

The oil is marketable at the well site, the Satellite and the Battery. Transcript,

pp. 233-234 (Mr. Baza). The price paid for oil at the well site might be less than the price paid for
oil at the Battery because there is usually "additional processing" to the oil to get a more refined
product at the Battery. Transcript, pp. 230-231 (Mr. Baza).
3 3.

When operators sell their production at the well site, it has been Respondent's

longstanding position that the operators pay severance tax on the lower adjusted posted price paid at
the well site. Transcript, p. 250 (Ms. Goss); and Transcript, p. 284 (Mr. Simpson).
34.

If the operator sold oil at the well site that is where Respondent considered the

production to be complete and Respondent based the severance tax on the value at that point. It was
Respondent's position that production was not complete at the well site, however, if the operator
7
7

Appeal No. 00-0901

chose not to sell at the well site, but rather, moved the oil to a Satellite or Battery for sale.
Respondent's position is that production is completed at the point of the sale and Respondent relies
on the sales contract to determine the value at that point for severance tax purposes. If the product is
sold from the Satellite that is where production is complete, or if it is sold from the Battery or into
the pipeline that is were production is complete.
35.

Respondent's position in determining where production is complete is

consistent with its long-standing practice, which practice was the same prior to a 1990 law change as
it is today.
36.

The current statute was adopted in 1990. Mr. Simpson had been an employee

of the Tax Commission at that time and had been involved with the bill to revise the law, although
he did not attend Senate or House of Representative hearings where the bill was debated. It was his
testimony that Respondent did not consider the revision to have modified where production was
considered to be complete, or the use of the contract price at the point of sale. When preparing the
fiscal note for the bill, Respondent determined that as it pertained to the issue before the
Commission, there would be no financial impact from the 1990 revision.
37.

Petitioner is not the only taxpayer who has been affected by Respondent's

policy and practice. There are other similarly situated taxpayers whose severance tax payments have
been based over the period of many years on the value at the point of sale.
38.

The witnesses differed as to their opinions of where production was complete.

Mr. Baza thought the oil and gas products could be complete at multiple locations. Mr. Baza
believed production was complete at the well if the operator chose to sell it there. He believed that
8
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the production could also be complete at the Satellite or the Battery if the operator chose to sell the
oil and gas at those points. Transcript, pp. 233-234.
39.

Mr. Lambert testified he believes that production was complete at the well

site where it was first marketable even though the operator may choose for economic reasons not to
sell it there. Transcript, pp. 121-122.
40.

Mr. Simpson testified that he believed the oil and gas production was

complete when it was in a "marketable condition." Transcript, pp. 256 and 284. However, he
interpreted "marketable condition" to be where it was actually marketed. Transcript, p. 318. Mr.
Simpson testified that if the operator sold oil at the well, the production would be complete at the
well. Transcript, p. 284. Mr. Simpson testified, however, that he did not believe production would
be complete at the well if the operator chose not to sell at the well, but rather, moved the production
to a Satellite or Battery for sale. Transcript, pp. 322-323.
APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Each person owning an interest... in oil or gas produced from a well in the
state or in the proceeds of the production, shall pay to the state a severance
tax equal to 4% of the value, at the well, of the oil or gas produced, saved,
and sold or transported from the field where the substance was produced.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-102(l)(a).

B.

"Value at the well" means the value of oil or gas at the point production is
completed. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101 (19).

C.

"Well or wells" means any extractive means from which oil or gas is
produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one
person. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(20).

D.

"Oil" means crude oil or condensate or any mixture thereof, but does not
include solid hydrocarbons.

0 0 / :7 7

Appeal No. 00-0901

(a) "Crude oil" means those hydrocarbons, regardless of
gravity, that occur naturally in the liquid phase in the reservoir
and are produced and recovered at the wellhead in liquid
form. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(8).
E.

"Gas" means natural gas or natural gas liquids or any mixture thereof, but
does not include solid hydrocarbons.
(a) "Natural gas" means those hydrocarbons, other than oil
and other natural gas liquids separated from natural gas, that
occur naturally in the gaseous phase in the reservoir and are
produced and recovered at the wellhead in gaseous form.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-101(5).

ANALYSIS
This proceeding has been limited to the issue of what point the oil or gas produced
was "at the well" for the purposes of determining the amount of the severance tax pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a). Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a) provides that the amount of
the severance tax is 4% of "the value, at the well." "At the well," or specifically, "value at the well"
has been defined by statute to mean the value of oil or gas at the point "production is completed."
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-101(19). The question left to the Tax Commission is at what point is
"production completed."
Petitioner argues production is completed at the well site, which would provide a
uniform basis for the severance tax for all producers, whether or not there was further treatment or
refinement of the product before it was sold. Respondent argues production is completed at the point
it is actually marketed or sold. Respondent's position reflects its long-standing policy that has
heretofore been unchallenged.
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In making its decision in this matter the Commission notes that the legislature has
expressly defined "at the well" to mean something other than simply the well or well site. The
statutory definition indicates the determining factor is the point where "production is completed."
The legislature provided no definition for where "production is completed," tacitly leaving it up the
Tax Commission, as the agency responsible for administration of the statute, to interpret the phrase.
There have been no revisions to the relevant statutes since 1990, and in fact it was
Respondent's understanding that the 1990 revision did not change the point were the oil or gas
should be valued for purposes of determining the severance tax. Respondent's practice was the same
prior to the 1990 revision as after the revision and has continued uniformly in the same manner up to
the date of this hearing. This long-standing practice has been to determine the value for severance
tax purposes at the point the oil or gas is actually sold.
Respondent's interpretation of where "production is completed" gives consideration to
all terms of the statute. It takes into account that "value at the well" has statutorily been defined to
mean something more than just the value at the well, it has been defined as where "production is
completed." It is a permissible interpretation and not unreasonable given the language of the statute.
The courts have noted that past administrative practice is a basis for statutory
interpretation. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "In case of any uncertainty or ambiguity in the
statute, a reasonable administrative interpretation and practice should be given some weight. This is
particularly true when such administrative interpretation and practice has persisted for a long time
without any legislative correction or change."

Boards of Educ. v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 749

P.2d 1264, (Utah 1988) citing Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, at 741-742. In
11
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Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581, 587-589 (Utah 1991) the Utah
Supreme Court explained:
In the absence of a discernible legislative intent concerning the
specific question in issue, a choice among permissible interpretations
of a statute is largely a policy determination. The agency that has
been granted authority to administer the statute is the appropriate
body to make such a determination. Indeed, both the legislative
history to section 63-46b-16 and our prior caises suggest that an
appellate court should not substitute its judgment for the agency's
judgment concerning the wisdom of the agency's policy.
In the appeal at hand, Respondents' representatives were involved to some extent with
the legislation and were clearly charged with the duty of administering the statute. They did not
discern a legislative intent contrary to their practice at that time.
The Commission notes that Petitioner is not the only party who has been affected by
Respondent's long standing practice. There are other similarly situated taxpayers who have been
filing their returns over the past ten or more years in a manner consistent with that policy. If the
Commission starts issuing refunds to those who have filed a refund request there would be an
inconsistency with those who have not filed or not filed timely such a request. The Tax Commission
determines that this is a situation where the Commission should not reverse its long-settled position
and make a fundamental policy change without following administrative rule making requirements,1
or without a legislative amendment.

1

See Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773,777 (Utah 1986)

2

In addition the Commission notes that consistency of practice is addressed in the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act which provides appellate court relief in situations were an
agency's actions are contrary to its prior practice. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).
12
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The Commission acknowledges that Petitioner presents a well-reasoned argument for
its contention that production is completed for purposes of the statute at the well site. However,
Respondent's interpretation is also a reasonable and permissible definition, is the one that has been in
use for more than ten years and has been applied consistently with a number of similarly situated
taxpayers.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
For purposes of the unique statutory definition of "value at the well" which pertains
not to "at the well" but instead the point "production is completed," and consistent with the longstanding practice of the Respondent, "production is completed" at the point of sale. Therefore,
"value at the well" for the purposes of Utah Code Ann. 59-5-102(1 )(a) is the point of sale.
DECISION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's appeal, as it pertains to the bifurcated matter at
issue, is denied. It is so ordered.
DATED this

of April, 2002.

Jane Phan
Administrative Law Judge
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION:
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concurs in this decision,

this J_9_ day of

/&^S£

, 2002.

Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair

^ioF{]^- i £

CONCURRENCE

I concur with the majority and additionally submit the following comments to support
the majority decision. Utah Code Ann. §59-5-101(19) defines "value at the well" as the value of oil
or gas at the point production is completed. I find this language inherently ambiguous. For example,
does "value at the well" mean value at the wellhead, where it is capped, as in "at the Christmas
tree"? Or does it mean, value at the well site, which would include basic separation tanks whether
mobile or permanent? Or does it mean at the satellite, where further refining takes place?

Utah

Code Ann. §59-5-101 (20) provides some clarification. "Well" is defined as "any extractive means
from which oil is produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and operated by one
person."

Testimony in this case indicates that oil and gas could be taken at the wellhead or

Christmas tree, or at the mobile separation tanks, or at the satellite all of which are operated by one
person. (Tr. At 236.) It should be noted that while the witnesses agreed that satellites were usually
operated by more than one person, one witness testified that it was conceivable that a single person

14
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could operate a satellite. This suggests that production can be viewed as a process not a physical
location. Therefore, there is no straightforward understanding of the statute.
In order to understand legislative intent, one should look to Utah Code Ann. §59-5103(1). The preferred method of valuing oil and gas is an arms-length contract for the purchase of
production at the well. Some of the production was sold in this fashion, but much of it was sold
further down in the process. Unfortunately, there is no testimony in the record which would cause
one to find any other applicable method to conform to statutory framework beyond an arms-length
contact.
Finally, and in view of the discussion presented above, it appears to be reasonable for
the Division to have made administrative decisions on how to impose severance taxes in this case.
The Division appears to be consistent with other government agencies on both the allocation and
reporting of the volumes of oil. The total volumes are allocated back to individual wells for
purposes of reporting production to the State Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining. (Tr. At 267.) While
individual production tests may be done by routing an individual well through a testing mechanism
for a test period, typically 24 hours, there are no measurement devices at each individual well. (Tr.
At 178-179.) The Division uses the production figures reported to the Division of Oil, Gas, and
Mining in conducting severance tax audits. (Tr. At 277.) There are in place arms-length contracts to
call for the transfer of product in a marketable condition. The production can be deemed to be
complete, therefore, at the point the product is in the condition described by the contract. The
contract provides both parties' understanding of what constitutes completed production and contains
a definite methodology for both determining the price and measuring the volume. The division has
15
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correctly determined that an arms-length contract at that point is the preferable method for valuing
oil or gas.

/^L^Z/djuL,

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner

CONCURRENCE
I concur only in the ultimate finding of this limited hearing. That is, that no refund is
due to the Respondent. With respect to the underlying issue of the definition of value at the well, I
disagree with the basic findings, and agree with the points made by Commissioner Bruce Johnson in
his dissenting opinion.
To reiterate Commissioner Johnson's position, not only the clear statutory language,
but also the very nature of a severance tax itself, both lead to the conclusion that oil must and can
only be valued at the wellhead. To interpret the statute otherwise, or to add meaning to it, is beyond
the purview of this body or the Auditing Division. I see no ambiguity in the statute. Utah Code Ann.
§59-5-101 (20) specifies a well is defined so as to be "operated by one person" and "located within an
oil or gas field." Since oil cannot be and is not sold upon immediate emission from the Christmas
tree, and the satellites involve more than one person, the only possible definition of the well is the
well; not a satellite or a contract.
Rather, I believe that this interpretation, albeit correct, should apply only
prospectively. There is justification to allow for "the decision to be applied nonretroactively... by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first
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impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97 (1971). The principles of retroactivity and prospectivity, are also discussed within varying
contexts in a line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, including Cipriano v. City ofHouma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969) and American Trucking Assns.t Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
In the present situation both the taxpayer and the Division had been adhering to a
long-standing practice and interpretation. It was not until 1999, well after even a statutory change in
1990, that ExxonMobil redetermined its tax calculation based on a new interpretation of the statute.
Although this interpretation is correct, the State of Utah had come to rely on a source of revenue in
accordance with a well established and generally accepted practice. I believe that a refund of those
taxes would place an unfair burden on the State. Moreover, similarly situated taxpayers have also
been taxed based on their contracts. Therefore, I would find that the practice going forward should
be changed, and taxes for all taxpayers calculated in accordance with the statutory definition as
elucidated by the Respondent and Commissioner Bruce Johnson.

tUt^i
Marc B. John:
Commissio:
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DISSENT
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of my colleagues. I do not believe it
is supported by the language of the statute, by rules of statutory construction, by sound administrative
policy or by fairness.
It is undisputed that a severance tax is imposed on oil and gas based on the "value at
the well." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a). "Value at the well" is defined as "the value of oil or
gas at the point production is completed." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-101(19). "Well" is defined as
"any extractive means from which oil is produced or extracted, located within an oil or gas field, and
operated by one person." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-101(20). These provisions would appear to be
relatively straightforward. The parties agree where the wells are. Oil and gas is "produced or
extracted" from those wells. That is the point at which valuation for severance taxes should occur.
The majority opinion does not see it that way. They believe the definition of
"production," an undefined term in the statute, is ambiguous. They use one possible definition of
that term to override the statutory directive that the oil and gas production must be valued at the well.
Instead, they would value some production at the well, if a sale occurred there, other production at
the satellite, if a sale occurred there, and other production at the battery or the LACT, if a sale
occurred there. They adopt this position even though all parties agree that a battery cannot be
operated by one person and cannot be considered a "well" for purposes of the statute.1 Thus, the
majority's interpretation conflicts with the clear meaning of the statute.

1

The witnesses also agreed that satellites were usually operated by more than one person, but Mr. Lambert
conceded that it was "conceivable" that a single person could operate a satellite.
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The majority reaches this decision in part because most of the production was not sold
in an arms-length contract at the well. Rather, it was sold at the LACT. The preferred method of
valuing oil and gas, set out in Section 59-5-103(1), is an arms-length contract for the purchase of
production at the well. Some of the production from this field was, in fact, sold pursuant to such
contracts and the majority, to its credit, uses "value at the well" for those sales. Most of the product,
however, was not sold at the well, but was sold downstream. The statute provides for that
eventuality, as well. In the absence of a contract for sale at the well, the state must use the first
applicable method of three set out in the statute- (1) a non-arms length sale, provided the values are
equivalent to an arms-length sales price, (2) other reliable public sources of price or market
information, or (3) the value using the net-back method. The majority disregards this statutory
framework by interpreting "production" to be complete only when there is an arms-length sale.
The majority's interpretation does not promote fairness and equity. The severance tax
is a tax on the "value" of the severed product. It is not a sales tax. Under the majority's ruling,
however, two barrels of oil from the same field with identical characteristics would be taxed
differently if their owners had different marketing strategies. The owner who chose to add value by
further processing its product would be penalized with a higher tax burden.2 Such disparate
treatment of similarly situated taxpayers should be avoided unless the legislature clearly intends to
treat them differently.

2

The statutory net-back method, which the majority ignores, clearly requires some such processing costs to
be deducted from a sales price in order to derive taxable value. See Section 59-5-10(7).
3

If the legislature chose to make such a distinction, I believe there would be a rational basis to do so, i.e.,
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Finally, I do not believe the majority opinion furthers sound tax administrative
policy. I agree that we should not lightly undertake a revision to a long-standing administrative
interpretation. I also agree that most, if not all, taxing statutes are subject to varying interpretations
and a reasonable interpretation of Jong-standing may indicate legislative acquiescence in that
interpretation. I do not think, however, that those considerations justify the majority opinion. First, I
do not think the majority opinion represents a reasonable interpretation of the statute, taken as a
whole. Second, we have been cited no cases that would indicate that the Division's position was
ever approved by the Commission. The lack of published opinions or guidance makes it unlikely
that the legislature could be deemed to be aware of the Division's position. This is a case of first
impression with the Commission. We have the constitutional duty to administer the tax laws of the
state. We should not deny the Petitioner a refund just because it is the first taxpayer to challenge the
Division's interpretation.

R. Bruce Johnson
jf
Commissioner / /

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for Reconsideration with the
Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13. a Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered
evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order
constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this
order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq.
JKP/00-0901 fof

the reliability of an existing arms-length contract would eliminate uncertainty and simplify compliance. But such
distinctions should be made by the legislature, they should not be implied as a matter of administrative convenience.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission upon a Petition for
Reconsideration, dated May 8,2002, filed by Petitioner as a result of the Commission's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision, dated April 19,2002 (f,Final Decision"). Respondent
filed an Opposition to Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration on June 11, 2002. Phillips
Petroleum, an unrelated party, filed an Amicus Brief in Support of ExxonMobil's Request for
Reconsideration on May 14, 2002, which was received and reviewed by the Commission.
Upon review of these submission's the Commission issued an Order Granting
Reconsideration on June 28, 2002. In the order the Commission requested further briefing and a
hearing limited to two specific issues. The Commission stated that after the further briefing and
hearing the Commission would issue a decision which may or may not amend or revise its Final
Decision in this matter. Both parties submitted the supplemental briefing on August 7, 2002. On
September 12, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion to Strike a portion of Respondent's supplemental brief.
After a telephone conference with the parties and the Administrative Law Judge, on September 17,
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2002, a Revised Order on Reconsideration was issued in which one of the issues scheduled for
briefing and hearing, the issue concerning industry practice, was eliminated due to the fact that both
parties found the issue to be irrelevant and it was considerably difficult for the parties to discover
and present the evidence requested on that issue.
A Hearing on Reconsideration was held on September 19, 2002, limited to the
remaining issue which concerned the burden of proof as it relates to which party prevails in the event
of a tie vote between the Commissioners. Presiding at the hearing were the four State Tax
Commissioners and Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge. David Crapo, of Wood Crapo, LLC, was
present and represented Petitioner. Clark Snelson, Assistant Attorney General was present and
represented Respondent.
APPLICABLE LAW
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-29 provides that a Petition for Reconsideration
"will allege as grounds for reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery of new
evidence" that could not, with due diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial. Under this
rule, the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying a Petition for
Reconsideration.
DECISION AND ORDER
The Commission's Final Decision in this matter had been limited to the bifurcated
factual and legal issue of what point in the production the oil and gas was "at the well" for purposes
of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5-102(l)(a). In a split decision, Commissioners Pam Hendrickson and
Palmer DePaulis concluded that "at the well," statutorily defined as the point "production is
-2-
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completed," was the point of sale. Commissioner Marc Johnson concurred with the result, in that
he concluded that no refund should be issued, but he disagreed with Commissioners Hendrickson
and DePaulis as to the meaning of the value "at the well." Commissioner Bruce Johnson dissented
from the majority decision, finding for the Petitioner on the issue.
Upon review of the submissions of the parties during the reconsideration process,
Commissioners Hendrickson, Depaulis and Bruce Johnson each hereby affirm their original
positions as expressed in the Final Decision issued in this matter and they make no change or
modification to Final Decision. However, Commissioner Marc Johnson has reconsidered his
decision as expressed in the Final Decision. Upon review of the written submissions concerning the
reconsideration and also the fact that both parties concluded that the issue of industry practice was
not relevant to the decision, Commissioner Marc Johnson hereby abandons his Concurrence as
issued in the Final Decision and joins fully in Commissioner Bruce Johnsonfs Dissent.
The result of this change is a tie vote among the Commissioners with two
Commissioners finding that the value "at the well" or where "production is completed" is the point
of sale, and two Commissioners finding that the value "at the well" or where "production is
completed" is the point where oil and gas is produced or extracted from the well.
This leads to the issue of which side prevails in the event of a tie among the
Commissioners. Prior to 1998, the Tax Commission rules were clear as to which party prevailed in
the event of a tie. Utah Admin. Rule R 861-1A-5(E)(1997) stated in pertinent part, "If the
Commission vote results in a tie vote on any matter, the position of the petitioning taxpayer will be
deemed to have prevailed, and the Commission will publish the decision." The Tax Commission
-3-
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rules were amended and revised in 1998 and this provision was eliminated. Utah Admin. Rule
R861-1 A-21(B) was enacted in 1998 and remains in effect to date. It states, "The party charged with
the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory presumption shall prevail only if a
majority of the participating commissioners rules in that party's favor." It is the Commission's
conclusion from the briefing and oral argument on this issue that Petitioner is the party charged with
the burden of proof or the burden of overcoming a statutory presumption. Therefore, Petitioner
would need three commissioners to find in its favor in order to prevail.
The origination of this appeal is a request on the part of Petitioner for a refund of
severance taxes which Petitioner felt it had overpaid. Respondent formally denied the refund request
and Petitioner filed an appeal of Respondent's denial. The determination of whether Petitioner
overpaid essentially presented the question of what was the proper amount of the severance tax. This
raised two issues. The first issue being at what point of the production process are oil and gas
valued. The second issue, after the appropriate point in production is determined, is what then is the
value of the oil and gas at that appropriate point. The two issues were bifurcated. Only the first
issue, at what point are the oil and gas valued, was considered at the Formal Hearing and was the
subject of the Final Decision.
Petitioner argues that the first issue is essentially a question of law and that the burden
of proof on this specific issue is on Respondent. Petitioner acknowledges that it would have the
burden of proof on the second issue, valuation, as the second issue is essentially an issue of fact. In
support of this position, Respondent points to Butler v. State Tax Commission, 367 P.2d 852 (Utah
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1962) and other cases.1
The Commission disagrees with Petitioner. In Butler, the Utah Supreme Court stated
that the taxing authority did have the burden of showing that the tax, use tax in that case, was
applicable. Butler at 854. In the appeal at hand, clearly the severance tax is applicable, that is not
the dispute. The dispute is what point in the production process should the oil and gas be valued in
order to determine the amount of the severance tax.
Petitioner is the party seeking affirmative relief in this matter. If Petitioner had not
appealed Respondent's denial of the refund request, the denial would have stood as a final action.
In addition, it is the Commission's conclusion that the issue of what point the oil and gas is to be
valued for severance tax purposes is a question of both law and fact.
Based on the forgoing, although Commissioner Marc Johnson vacates his
Concurrence and joins the Dissent in the Final Decision, the Final Decision in all other respects
remains unchanged and is affirmed by this order. Respondent prevails from the tie vote of the
Commissioners. Therefore, the value "at the well" for the purposes of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-5102(l)(a) remains the point of sale as described in the Final Decision. It is so ordered.

Additional cases cited by Petitioner are Gillette Co- v.
Department of Treasury, 497 N.W. 2d 595 (MI Ct. App. 1993) cert,
denied, 513 U.S. 1103 (1995); and DiStefano et al. v. Commission.
of Revenue, 476 N.E. 2d 161 (MA 1985).
-5-
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As the Formal Hearing and Final Decision were limited to the one bifurcated issue
and the second issue concerning valuation is yet unresolved, this matter will be scheduled for further
administrative proceedings on the second issue.
DATED this / /

day of [kidbcf

, 2002

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair
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R. Bruce Johnson
Commissioner

-

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner

MarcB
Commissi
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 31, 2002, Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis
that there is no dispute as to any material fact and Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. On November 12, 2002, Petitioner filed an Objection to the Division's Motion disputing the
accuracy of some of the alleged facts set forth therein. On that same day Petitioner also filed a Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment indicating that summary judgment was appropriate if the factual
basis for the motion was corrected to be consistent with the prior decisions of the Commission in this
matter.
Petitioner had originally filed its Petition for Redetermination in this matter to appeal
Respondent's denial of a refund request. The appeal presented two issues before the Commission.
The first was what point was oil and gas "production completed" for purposes of Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 59-5-101(19). The second issue, once the appropriate point was determined, was what was the
value of the oil or gas at that point. These two issues were bifurcated and the parties presented the
first issue before the Commission at a Formal Hearing, The Tax Commission issued its decision on
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the first issue on April 19, 2002, holding in its Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Final
Decision ("Final Order") as follows:
'"production is completed1 at the point of sale. Therefore, Value at the
wellf for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 59-5-102)(l)(a) is the point of
sale."
Final Order, p. 13. Petitioner subsequently filed a Request for Reconsideration and on October 11,
2002, the Commission issued its Final Order on Reconsideration which upheld its ruling on the first
issue.
Following the Commission's Final Order on the first issue, the point where
'production is completed', the only remaining issue before the Commission was the second issue of
what is the value of the oil and gas at that point. Although Petitioner objected to Respondent's
characterization of parts of the Commission's decision, Petitioner agrees that based on the
Commission's actual ruling on the first issue, summary judgment on the second issue is appropriate.
In considering the second issue, the only relevant fact in determining if Petitioner is
entitled to its requested refund is whether the values claimed on Petitioner's original returns during
the audit period were based on the value of the oil and gas at the point of sale or some other point.
In the Motion for Summary Judgement, Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and the
accompanying memoranda, there is no dispute as to the fact that the production values Petitioner
reported on its original severance tax filings, and for which it paid the severance tax during the
period at issue, were based on the sale prices received at the various points of sale. The parties do
not dispute the values attributed to the production at that point. Based on the standard determined
by the Commission in its Final Order, that the oil and gas should be valued at the point of sale,
-2-
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Petitioner is not entitled to its requested refund and Summary Judgment against Petitioner is
appropriate, fully resolving this appeal.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and incorporating the Final Order on the bifurcated issue,
the Commission finds that Summary Judgment against Petitioner is appropriate and no refund is due.
This is the final resolution of all matters in this appeal. It is so ordered.
DATED this

i

day of

2002.

Janj£ Plian
I
Administrative Law Judge

BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION.
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision.

DATED this

lj

day of \y?C&W^A

Pam Hendrickson
Commission Chair

2002

-

Palmer DePaulis
Commissioner
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PARTIAL CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
The undersigned Commissioners concur in part and dissent in part. We continue to
disagree with the majority decision in the Final Order on thefirstbifurcated issue and our dissent
in that Final Order is incorporated herein by reference. Because the Commission's Final Order has
determined that the appropriate valuation point is the point of sale, and that Final Order now
represents the law of this case, we concur that summary judgment is appropriate on the second issue
because there is no dispute as to the value of the oil and gas at that point.

R. Bruce Johnso^
Commissioner/^

Marc B. Jo
Commission*

Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for
Reconsideration with the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for
Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann.
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq.
JKP/00-0901.SJ2
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AND FINAL DECISION
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UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
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Appeal No. 83-1676
)

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Conunission far
a formal hearing on Wednesday, May 24, 1989.

Hearing the matter

for and on behalf of the Tax Commission were R. H. Hansen,
Chairman; Jo© p. Pacheco, Commissioner; and G. Blaine Davis,
Commissioner and Presiding Officer.

we r e
H ^ H |

Present and representing the

feHHBHHHBHHBIHBH|

Present and representing the Respondent was Lee A. Dever,

Assistant Attorney General.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I«
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The tax in question is occupation tax.
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2.
The audit period in question i s January l, 1980
through December 31, 1986.
3.

(hereinafter c o l l e c t i v e l y referred to as Petitioners) are separate
corporations, each incorporated under the laws of Delaware.

Each

a subsidiary of ^ H | ^ ^ | ^ | ^ H |
4.

The Petitioners owned a number of o i l and gas wells

located within Utah.
to as t
The

reservoir.

h

Some of those were located in what i s
@

^

B

H

|

FlGld

'

^ ^ ^ H H ^ I ^ ^ H Field i s a gas-condensate

Tne natural gas liquids (NGL's) produced from t h i s

field are delivered to a common carrier pipeline which, in turn,

the
6

'

^°flHBIHHI^HHl^HHIHHHi

Pursuant to a contract entered into by the
and^^HHIHHHi
flflHHHi
^^^^^^••i^M^B'
flFJVMa<?ree3.
to purchase

the NGL's produced by the Petitioners.

The price paid

b y f l ^

^ • w a s based on the average monthly prices for such products as
published bv the
flU^H^HHlA
.r.
1
v
w^mmmm^m
Price information Service. Prom
that price, deductions were made for transportation, fractionation
and marketing fees to arrive at the actual price paid by
fl^M
to the P e t i t i o n e r s .
^^^^^"
7.
The amount of occupation tax paid by the Petitioners
for the o i l and gas produced from t h e l f l | ^ | F i e l d v a 6
based upon the amount of money received f r o m f l B u n d e r t h e t e r m s
of the contract.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

For purposes of computing the occupation tax, the value
of o i l or gas at the well shall be the value established under a
bona fide contract for the purchase of the same, or in the absence
of a contract, by the value at the wall established by the United
States for royalty purposes (Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-67(2) (b)(i>).
DECISION AND ORDER
In the present case, the Petitioners contend that the
value at the well of the gas and oil'removed at the

H H H H B

Field for purposes of determining the amount of occupation tax to
be paid is the net price paid ^ y H H I

f a r

those products

under the terms of the contract.
The Commission i s not persuaded by the arguments of the
Petitioners.

Section 59-5-67(3) states:

Any contract between a parent and a subsidiary-company,
or between companies wholly or partially owned by a
common parent, or between companies otherwise a f f i l i a t e d
that s p e c i f i e s the value of minerals s h a l l not be deemed
bona fide unless the value of minerals s p e c i f i e d i s
proportionate to the mineral's reasonable f a i r cash
value, in the event of a controversy, t h e tax commission
shall determine the fair cash value of the mineral.
Petitioners argue that under this subsection, the
contract between them a n d ^ ^ ^ ^ H H ^ H B i s a bona fide
contract because the value established by the contract i s
proportionate t o the f a i r market value.

That, however, i s only

half of the t e s t t o determine whether or not a contract i s bona
fide for purposes of S 59-5-67.

The other half of the t e s t

-3DIV22
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is found in S 59-5-67, which requires the value of oil and gas to
be set "at the well".

It is this requirement that the

Petitioners' pricing scheme fails to satisfy.
Under the clear and literal meaning of § 59-5-67, "at the
well" means the gross value of those products at the point o T
their removal from the well,

it does not mean the price obtained

at some point downstream after deducting costs incurred for
transportation, fractionation, and marketing fees,

The position

of the Petitioners also does not account for "shrinkage," or
product which is lost in the process, because the quantities which
are sold are smaller than the quantities which come through the
meters at the top of the wells.

Therefore, the Commission finds

that the contract relied upon by the Petitioners to establish the
value of the oil and gas produced at the wells was not a bona fide
contract within the meaning of § 59-5-103.
Having so decided, the Commission next turns to the issue
of what the correct method of valuing of the oil and gas is.
Again, § 59-5-103 provides the statutory guideline to be followed
in making that determination.
Under § 59-5-103, if a bona fide contract for the
purchase of production of oil or gas does not exist, the value of
the oil or gas at the well is that which is established by the
United States for royalty purposes (federal royalty method).

From

the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, it appears
that although there was a federal lease within the field, which
could have been used to establish the federal royalty price, the
existence of that lease was not known at the time of the audit,
Thus, the federal royalty method was not applied.
-4-
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Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that
the correct method for determining the value of the oil and gas
removed from the veils located within
Field is the federal royalty method.

t h e ^ ^ m m B B B B
The Auditing Division is

hereby ordered to adjust its audit and to compute the tax due
based upon the federal'royalty method.
DATED this

7*^

day of

It is so ordered.
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>.

1990.

BY ORDER OP THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

Chairman

foe B. Pacheco
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have
to file a request
the date of final
judicial review.

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

ten (10) days after the date of the final—a*for reconsideration or thirty (30) days after
order to file in Supreme Court a petition for
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46o-13(l), 63-46b-l4(2)(a)
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:

James H. Rogers
Director, Auditing Div.
Heber M. Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Craig Sandberg
Assistant Director, Auditing
Heber M« Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Sam Vong
Operations, Central Files
Heber M. Wells Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84134
Brad Simpson
Oil 6 Gas Auditor
Heber M. Wells Building
salt Lake city, U T
84134
Lee Dever
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT
84114

DATED t h i s

.tfc.

ft^

day o f _ ^ 0 / ) U L

secretary
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